Institutional quality and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa: Can management effort and bribes compensate for low-quality institutions? by Gori Olusina Daniel (7186388) et al.
1 
 
Institutional quality and economic 
development in sub-Saharan Africa: Can 
management effort and bribes 
compensate for low-quality institutions? 
 
Gori Olusina Daniel, Kun Fu, Wilfred Dolfsma (*) 
 
Loughborough University, London; Institute for Innovation & Entrepreneurship;  
3 Lesney Avenue, Broadcast center, Here East, QEOP; London E15 2GZ; UK 
 
(*) Corresponding author; w.a.dolfsma@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
The industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa is perhaps more affected by the quality of 
institutions than that of other regions. We investigate what alternatives managers have to 
secure what their firms need to function in case the institutional furniture they are 
confronted with is of low quality. We find that in high quality institutional environments 
management spending effort dealing with authorities and navigating regulations negates 
the effect of the institutional environment. Managers do not need to spend these efforts. 
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the positive effect of high-quality institutional 
environments on firm performance is enhanced by making informal payments.   
INTRODUCTION: Institutions and Firms 
Harry Trebing (1987) convincingly argued against a then mainstream consensus in 
economics that industry should face as little regulation as possible. The implicit assumption 
driving this view was that government failure was more likely or more detrimental than the 
market failures that were recognized. Trebing and others, prominent among these 
institutional economists, have since been able to demonstrate that the proper functioning 
of markets is dependent on appropriate institutions being in place as markets are 
necessarily embedded in society (see Dolfsma, 2013).  
2 
 
Mainstream economists and policymakers have, after North (1990), also embraced the idea 
that institutions affect the economy and firm performance. The World Bank (1998) and 
others, have since followed suit. A view has taken hold that if and when developing 
countries put in place the formal institutions that characterize western economies, private 
firms operating in their economies would benefit (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Lee and Kim, 
2009; Mair and Marti, 2009; Sutter et al., 2013). Without such institutions, an ‘institutional 
void’ is believed to exist that hampers firms’ performance (Mair et al., 2012). Others have 
indicated, in contrast, that in such circumstances of absent formal institutions that regulate 
the economic domain, institutions still affect firms. These can be informal institutions, or 
formal institutions from a different, adjacent practice or domain (see Olthaar et al., 2017).  
In this brief paper we address another potentially problematic untested view underlying the 
institutional void thesis: the idea that an inappropriate or unsatisfactory institutional 
‘furniture’ (Veblen 1961, p.236) forces entrepreneurs and managers of firms (we will also 
refer to this as Top Management Team - TMT) to seek alternative routes to obtain what 
they need for their firm to function.  
In this view, the preferred route is one where entrepreneurs and managers rely on clear, 
predictable and enforced formal rules that treat all equally; and equally efficiently. 
Consequently, in high-quality institutional environments, responses from public authorities 
and service providers become predictable in their nature and speed of delivery (World Bank 
1998, p.15). Public authorities and service providers deliver a range of key services to firms 
such as licences, permits, access to electricity, tax administration, legal underpinning of 
contracts between parties, and certainty of property rights. When public institutions are of 
high quality, firms can focus their efforts and resources on production and other more 
directly value creating activities.  
Without high quality institutions, again, in this view, entrepreneurs and managers must 
either spend a lot of effort navigating the inefficient regulatory system, or resort to other 
measures – such as informal payments (i.e. gifts or bribesi) to create an obligation (Darr, 
2003; Dolfsma et al. 2008) – to try to ensure that the interests of individuals working in 
public authorities and service providers will be aligned with those of private citizens and 
TMT members alike.  
Low-quality institutions can therefore increase the transaction costs of dealing with public 
authorities as they give individuals at all levels in these government agencies the 
opportunity to have their own interests prevail over those of the agency or of society as a 
whole. In such circumstances of government failure (cf. Dolfsma, 2013), extra efforts may be 
required by non-principal individuals and TMT members in visiting authorities repeatedly, by 
monitoring procedures, or by obtaining the resources firms require from rogue agents. 
Under these conditions, informal payments as described, and TMT efforts, are thus 
perceived as substitutes for the quality of the institutional furniture; and can be thought to 
compensate for the strength or quality of a country’s institutional furniture.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual model that characterises informal payments and TMT 
efforts as substitutes for the quality of the institutional furniture in a country.  
<Figure 1> 
We empirically test this view directly in this short paper. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa is 
appropriate as institutional quality varies substantially, following the differing pace and 
success of reforms to deepen democratic values and institutions, and adopt market 
liberating policies since the 1990s (UNCTAD & UNIDO, 2011); and that TMT efforts dealing 
with an inefficient regulatory system, as well as the prevalence of informal payments, are 
believed to be rife. 
METHOD 
Data and Sample. We use the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) of firm-level data, 
which contains information about private firms from key manufacturing and service sectors 
across 139 countries in the world. The Enterprise Surveys adopt standardized survey 
instruments and a uniform sampling frame to produce a representative sample and 
harmonised data that are comparable across a wide range of economies, which enables 
understanding of how and which factors and institutions in the business environment affect 
firm performance over time and across countries (World Bank, 2007). We draw on other 
sources of data to compile the country-level variables such as the Economic Freedom Index 
provided by the Fraser Institute, the data on country’s overall socioeconomic conditions 
from the World Bank and the IMF. We draw the sample from a population of firms surveyed 
from 35 African countries over a 10-year period of time between 2006 and 2015. A total of 
17,757 observations are included in the sample. 
Dependent variable. Firm performance is the dependent variable and is measured by 
a fiscal year’s total sales of a firm. We convert the local currency into the internal dollar and 
factor in the purchasing power parity to ensure the comparability across countries over 
time.  
Independent variables. Institutional Effectiveness is concerned with how well 
institutions relate with each other, and are fit for purpose from the perspective of the wider 
society (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013). We measure this by the overall degree of economic 
freedom index provided by the Fraser Institute, which draws on a composite measure of 42 
distinct variables across five major areas a) Size of Government; b) Legal system and security 
of property rights c) Sound money d) Freedom to trade internationally; and e) Regulation. 
Top management effort is the percent of senior management's time spent in dealing with 
regulations. We measure it by taking the difference between a firm’s TMT effort and the 
sector-level average value of TMT effort within the country in which the firm is located. 
Informal payment is often seen that gifts or informal payments are paid to public officials to 
“get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. This is 
measured by the percent of a firm’s total annual sales paid as informal payment.  
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Control variables. We control for a set of firm-level and country-level variables, 
which are associated with firms’ performance and measured as follows. Age of a firm (see 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1990) is measured by the difference between the year of observation 
and the year in which the firm was formally registered. Size of a firm (see Schumpeter, 1947) 
is measured by the number of employees of the firm, and coded as a categorical variable 
taking the value ‘1’ for small size firms with less than 20 employees, ‘2’ for medium size 
firms with less than 100 employees, and ‘3’ for large size firms with no less than 100 
employees. The industrial sector in which a firm’s primary business lies, which is measured 
by a categorical variable taking the value ‘1’ for manufacturing industry, ‘2’ for service 
industry, and ‘3’ for other industries. Ownership of a firm (see McGahan & Victer, 2009) is 
measured by the percent of the firm owned by private foreign individuals, companies or 
organizations. It is measured by a dummy variable and we assign the value “1” for foreign 
firms with more than 50% of the firm is owned by foreigners, and “0” for domestic firms. 
Manager’s experience (Ayyagari et al., 2011) is measured by the number of years a firm’s 
top manager has been working in the sector. Because a country’s wealth has been shown to 
influence firms’ performance, we control for the country’s GDP per capita (USD) adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (PPP). We control for population size of country as it captures 
the market size within the country. The year effect is controlled for as well. 
Data Analyses. The WBES dataset is hierarchical in structure, which means that the 
firm-level observations are nested within the country-level observations. With this data 
structure, firm-level data are likely to be correlated within countries. Traditional multiple 
regressions such as the ordinary least square regressions with a pooled data could result in 
biased estimations due to ignoring the nested data structure, thus violating the assumption 
of data independence (Hofmann et al., 2000). We therefore apply multi-level modelling 
techniques to analyse the data while accounting for the hierarchical structure of the 
dataset. We specify a two-level model with random intercept to evaluate firms’ 
performance by factoring in both the impact of institutional conditions at the country-level 
and the influence of informal payment and top management effort at the firm-level at the 
same time. The models are specified below. 
 
Level-1 equation: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Level-2 equations: 
𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾00 + 𝛾𝛾01𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢0𝑖𝑖 
𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾10 + 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖 
The level-1 equation predicts the direct effects (i.e. betas) of level-1 predictors on level-1 
outcomes, where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable for an individual observation at level 1 
(subscript i refers to a firm, subscript j refers to the country that the firm belongs to). 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
the firm-level (level-1) predictor. 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖 is the intercept of the dependent variable in country j 
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(level-2). 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 is the slope for the relationship in country j between the firm -level predictor 
and the dependent variable. 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the firm -level residual. The level-2 equations predict the 
effects (i.e., gammas) of level-2 predictors on level-1 betas as well as on the level-1 
intercept, where 𝛾𝛾00 is the overall intercept, which is the mean of the intercepts across 
countries. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is the country-level predictor. 𝛾𝛾01 is the slope or main effect of country-level 
predictor. 𝛾𝛾10 is the slope or main effect of individual-level  predictor. 𝑢𝑢0𝑖𝑖 and 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖 are 
country-level residuals. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all variables in the model are 
between 1.04 and 2.9, indicating our analysis is unlikely to be influenced by multicollinearity 
between variables. The multilevel equation specified in this study is: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾00+𝛾𝛾01𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  + 𝛾𝛾02𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾03𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾10𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾20𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾30𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾40𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛾𝛾50𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾60𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾70𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢0𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables for the analysis.  
Table 2 shows the regressions results, in which Model 1 is the baseline model including only 
control variables; Model 2 is the main effect model containing the key explanatory 
variables; Model 3 is the full model with interaction terms added to the model. The 
likelihood ratio tests show that adding institutional effectiveness, top management effort 
and informal payment as independent variables together in Model 2 and interaction terms 
in Model 3 both result in a statistically significant improvement in model fit (LR chi2(3) 
=237.5,  p<0.001 and LR chi2(2)= 28.21, p<0.001 respectively). 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Results in Table 2 show that our expectation that top management effort as well as informal 
payments can be used as substitutes for effective institutions only holds true for the former. 
Indeed, less top management effort is required to navigate regulations in high-quality 
institutional environments, typically characterised by clear, predictable, and properly 
enforced rules and regulations (World Bank, 1998). TMT efforts dealing with authorities and 
regulations also has a significant direct impact on firm performance. What is perhaps 
surprising, however, is that informal payments are not a substitute for low-quality 
institutional environments. The positive effect of high quality institutions on firm 
performance is enhanced by a firm making informal payments. Informal payments do not 
have a direct effect themselves on firm performance, as expected. We graphically illustrate 
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the interaction effects of top management effort and informal payments each matched 
against the overall institutional effectiveness of countries in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION: BRIBES AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
The finding that informal payments enhance institutional quality’s positive impact on firm 
performance is an unexpected one. We can offer a number of possible explanations.  
First, it might be that for a study that focuses on other regions, perhaps economically 
more developed, might return different results. Sub-Saharan Africa countries that have 
relatively high institutional quality might still not have high enough quality of institutions – 
that are free from political interference, treat all equally and, equally efficiently. Also, the 
practice of gift giving might be more culturally expected and accepted in sub-Saharan Africa. 
One should be aware, however, that anthropological studies have found the practice of gift 
giving rife across a range of countries. In developed countries there might be more 
regulation restricting the practice, and certainly the size of gifts, but gift giving happens 
nonetheless there as well (Dolfsma et al. 2009; Offer 1997; Smart 1983). 
We therefore believe that a second explanation for our remarkable finding is more 
plausible. Mauss (1954) has argued that there are three essential aspects of gift giving: 
giving, receiving and reciprocating. Reciprocation should not occur immediately, and what is 
reciprocated should not be predetermined in value. Gift giving thus creates and sustains 
relationships between concrete individuals. In a society that is characterized by low 
institutional quality, much uncertainty exists and the circumstances for relations to be 
stable may be absent. When giving a gift, the giver may not be sure that the givee is there to 
return a favour at some later stage. A givee will perhaps also be more inclined to treat an 
informal payment as a ransom payment rather than a gift to be reciprocated.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Institutional economists will not be surprised that high quality institutions in a society will 
make firms perform better. We find, as expected, that the efforts that a firm’s top 
management spends on dealing with regulation are a substitute for high quality institutions. 
What is surprising to scholars who implicitly would claim that formal institutions are of 
paramount importance for the economy, is that informal payments actually enhance the 
positive contribution of high-quality institutions to firm performance. We submit that this is 
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further support for the view that economists and policy makers need to adopt a more 
comprehensive understanding of how (and which) formal as well as informal institutions 
impact the economy in general, and firm performance in particular.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual model 
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Table 2 Estimation Results Using Multi-level Linear Regression Models 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Institutional Effectiveness 
 
0.808*** 0.805*** 
  
(0.054) (0.054) 
Top Management Effort 
 
0.043*** 0.039*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) 
Informal Payment 
 
0.001 0.002 
  
(0.005) (0.005) 
Top Management Effort X Institutional Effectiveness 
  
-0.024*** 
   
(0.006) 
Informal Payment X Institutional Effectiveness 
  
0.021*** 
   
(0.006) 
Size (medium) 0.499*** 0.498*** 0.497*** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Size (small) 1.190*** 1.180*** 1.181*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ownership 0.261*** 0.263*** 0.262*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Management Experience 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sector (service) 0.025* 0.019+ 0.020+ 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Sector (other) -0.026 -0.016 -0.015 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
GDP per cap_PPP (USD) -2.418*** -1.743*** -1.755*** 
 
(0.132) (0.128) (0.128) 
Population (million) 5.472*** 0.898** 0.807* 
 
(0.544) (0.332) (0.328) 
Year 2007 0.321*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 
 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
Year 2009 0.436*** 0.091 0.100 
 
(0.081) (0.084) (0.083) 
Year 2010 0.189** 0.201*** 0.196*** 
 
(0.065) (0.054) (0.053) 
Year 2011 0.382*** -0.419*** -0.384** 
 
(0.106) (0.120) (0.120) 
Year 2013 -0.445*** -0.054 -0.030 
 
(0.107) (0.076) (0.076) 
Year 2014 -0.189+ 0.068 0.084 
 
(0.107) (0.078) (0.077) 
Year 2015 1.047*** -0.149 -0.105 
 
(0.169) (0.184) (0.184) 
Constant 3.281** 0.442 0.365 
 
(1.193) (0.459) (0.451) 
Random-effects Parameters 
   Country-level variance 42.63 4.614 4.43 
 
(12.739) (2.158) (1.963) 
Firm-level residual 0.474 0.47 0.469 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Likelihood-ratio test    
Degree of freedom 16 19 21 
LR chi2  237.5*** 28.21*** 
Observations 17,757 17,757 17,757 
Number of countries 35 35 35 
Standard errors in parentheses; continuous variables all standardised; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Variables  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Mean 23553.69 2.11 6.24 -0.14 1.48 15.54 0.10 13.49 1.57 3725.52 55.40 2009.70 
Std. Dev. 2600197 6.55 0.69 14.38 0.68 13.32 0.30 9.48 0.59 3185.55 56.70 3.22 
Min 0 0 4.79 -25.55 1 1 0 0 1 559.39 1.25 2006 
Max 345000000 100 7.85 95.23 3 167 1 50 3 15306.39 176.00 2015 
1 Sales (million) 1                       
2 Institutional Effectiveness 0.13 1                     
3 Top Management Efforts (%) 0.07 0.02 d 1                   
4 Informal Payments (%) 0.01a -0.02 d 0.12 1                 
5 Size 0.39 0.02 d 0.07 -0.04 1               
6 Age 0.17 0.02 c 0.04 -0.03 0.33 1             
7 Ownership (foreign =1) 0.21 0.03 0.02 d -0.02 c 0.19 0.04 1           
8 Management Experience 0.11 -0.01a 0.04 -0.04 0.20 0.53 0.05 1         
9 Sector -0.04 -0.07 -0.003 a 0.004 a -0.15 -0.13 -0.001 a -0.08 1       
10 GDP per cap_PPP (USD) -0.20 0.47 0.001 a -0.03 -0.001 a -0.01 b -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 1     
11 Population (million) -0.15 -0.06 0.01 b 0.04 0.01 a 0.02 d -0.17 -0.06 -0.12 -0.004 a 1   
12 Year -0.12 -0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.07 0.16 -0.04 0.14 0.002 a -0.01 b 0.18 1 
Note: a indicates p> 0.1, b indicates p<0.1, c indicates p<0.05, d indicates p<0.01, all the rest p<0.001; n= 17,757. 
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i On the difference between gifts and bribes, see Rose-Ackerman (1998). For a review of the literature 
on gift exchange see Dolfsma et al. (2008). 
